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Introduction
In 2002, Romano Prodi, then President 
of  the  European  Commission,  proudly 
announced  a  plan  to  create  a  unified 
border  guard  for  the  European  Union. 
Police  from  various  member  states 
would serve together under the EU flag 
to protect their common external borders. 
The idea sought to promote a common 
European  identity  and  to  assuage 
continent-wide  fears  that  the  EU’s 
borders  were  hopelessly  under  siege. 
“We would like to reassure our citizens,” 
Prodi declared, “that we will protect our 
borders  against  terrorism,  organised 
crime and uncontrolled immigration.”1 
While a common EU border guard has 
yet  to  see  the  light  of  day,  a  common 
EU  export  strategy  has  emerged  in 
border  management  assistance.  Such 
assistance aims to help recipient states 
strike  a  healthy  balance  between 
open  and  secure  borders.  This  is  not 
entirely altruistic. As neighbours or near 
neighbours become better able to control 
trafficking, extremism, and undocumented 
migration across their borders, the less 
1   Qtd. in Peter Andreas, “Redrawing the Line: 
Borders  and  Security  in  the  21st  Century,” 
International Security 21, 2 (Fall 2003): pp. 78-
111.
likely  such  activities  are  to  reach  the 
frontiers of the European Union.
Since 2003, the EU has been exporting 
border  management  assistance  to  the 
Central Asian Republics via the Border 
Management  Programme  for  Central 
Asia (BOMCA), which has sought to train 
border  guards,  provide  key  technology 
and  infrastructure  at  border  crossings, 
and  prod  states  in  managing  their 
borders jointly. BOMCA is funded by the 
European Union and implemented by the 
United Nations Development Programme 
through  a  network  of  five  in-country 
teams wholly dedicated to BOMCA and 
the related CADAP programme.
The  European  Commission  is 
resoundingly enthusiastic about BOMCA, 
which has achieved much at little cost in 
a  difficult  political  environment.  Indeed, 
the programme’s continued presence in 
all Central Asian states is itself a success 
and  measures  well  in  comparison  to 
initiatives  in  the  EU’s  Central  Asia 
Strategy  for  a  New  Partnership,  2007-
2013. But a circumspect analysis of the 
programme is necessary if the EU is to 
make  the  most  of  its  assistance.  With 
that aim in mind, this brief first outlines 
BOMCA’s  mission  and  development. 
A  subsequent  section  takes  stock  of 
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BOMCA and the EU’s Role in Central Asia
BOMCA’s first operations began in Central Asia in 2003, 
mostly under the direction and sponsorship of the Austrian 
government. The programme aimed to assist Central Asian 
states  to  manage  their  borders  by  balancing  openness 
with  security;  a  tough  order  as  many  of  the  states  had 
experienced a number of problems along their frontiers that 
included trafficking, cross-border terrorism, undocumented 
migration, and escalation.
Worse yet, the border authorities of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan,  and  Tajikistan  (Turkmenistan  joined  later  in 
2006) were notoriously uneven in manpower, equipment, 
training and infrastructure. Uzbek border authorities were 
highly militarised, prone to closing the border indiscriminately, 
and  found  alien  the  idea  of  facilitating  movement.  By 
contrast,  Kyrgyz  and  Kazakh  border  authorities  lacked 
proper equipment and entered passport data by hand at 
official crossings. 
In this environment, BOMCA faced its first hurdles. French 
and Austrian officials in the programme were divided about 
how best to deploy BOMCA’s limited resources to address 
the  region’s  vast  border  control  needs.  The  programme 
was  besieged  with  requests  from  participating  countries 
for  border  patrol  equipment,  and  its  officials  ended  up 
pledging equipment many times the amount allowed by the 
budget.  While  this  created  disappointment  among  some 
Central Asian authorities, it also served as an early lesson 
of the region’s operating hazards. BOMCA’s officers would 
become more adept at processing requests for technical 
assistance and at deflecting egregious requests by some 
host governments who thought of the programme as an 
equipment-bearing gift horse. 
The programme’s first major operational challenge came in 
2004 as the government of Tajikistan replaced the Russian 
military units guarding its border with Afghanistan with a 
ragtag force of Tajik guards.2 BOMCA quickly scrambled 
to provide an assessment and create a plan of action for 
the Tajik border. The assessment revealed a total lack of 
training, equipment, and infrastructure – deficiencies that 
enabled the trafficking of opiates and precursor chemicals 
across  the  border.  Moreover,  Tajik  border  guards  and 
customs officials were not accustomed to working together 
at  border  crossings  and  competed  for  scarce  provisions 
and  housing. The  exit  of  the  Russian  units  also  had  an 
unforeseen  economic  effect.  The  Russian  soldiers  had 
set  up  trading  posts  at  their  compounds  and  used  their 
monthly wages to purchase goods from local traders. The 
2    Russian  military  units  had  remained  to  guard  the  border  with 
Afghanistan following Tajikistan’s independence from the Soviet Union 
in 1991.
sales monetised the impoverished economy and sustained 
villages cut off from national markets. When the soldiers left, 
a number of communities along the frontier were plunged 
further into poverty. 
BOMCA decided to concentrate its first main initiative on the 
Tajik-Afghan border. While the US military focused primarily 
on  the  western  sector,  BOMCA  invested  its  efforts  on 
remoter sections to the east along Tajikistan’s autonomous 
Gorno-Badakhshan  region.3  The  initiative  trained  border 
staff, provided operational handbooks, and equipped border 
crossings with vehicles, high frequency radios, night-vision 
equipment,  generators,  computers,  drug-testing  kits,  and 
passport readers. The Tajik initiative eventually expanded 
to  higher-order  training  and  building  facilities  for  border 
authorities. It also provided important lessons that BOMCA 
carried to future phases. 
Among  the  lessons  learned  was  the  need  for  better 
coordination.  BOMCA  did  not  consult  with  the  Russian 
government  about  its  plans  to  revamp  the  Tajik  border, 
an omission that greatly irked Moscow. Although Moscow 
decided  to  remove  Russian  guards  from  the  border, 
Russian officials had intended to continue mentoring and 
provisioning Tajik  Border  Forces.  Consequently,  they  felt 
BOMCA’s  actions  would  undermine  their  influence.  In 
subsequent years, BOMCA’s Dushanbe office held monthly 
coordination  meetings  and  took  great  pains  to  keep  the 
Russian  diplomats  involved.  The  Russian  FSB  team  in 
Dushanbe  always  attended  the  monthly  coordination 
meetings  and  consistently  expressed  support  for  the 
programme.  BOMCA’s Tajikistan  operations  now  enjoy  a 
level of Russian support that few other European initiatives 
in Central Asia can match.
By 2006 BOMCA expanded its plan of action and secured 
funding from more EU-member states. While this diluted 
the Austrian imprint of the programme, it gave BOMCA a 
stronger pan-European identity and enabled it to tackle more 
activities. Twelve projects comprised the new plan of action 
ranging from legal reforms in border management to the 
creation of dog units for drug interdiction, from sponsoring 
intelligence exchange to mine prevention in border areas 
(see Box 1).
BOMCA’s five in-country offices are staffed so as to provide 
in-house  expertise  on  the  particular  needs  of  their  host 
state.  Each  country  office  comprises  a  country  manager 
responsible  for  project  implementation  and  a  deputy 
country manager who steps in when the manager is away 
on escort duties for training courses, reporting duties to the 
Commission, or inspection visits to ongoing border projects. 
A technical engineer is employed to produce specifications 
3   This geographic division of labour was intended solely for practical 
reasons. The border was split into a US and EU sphere of action to 
ensure border assistance funds were distributed for maximum impact 
and to make it easier for donors and programme staff to travel to their 
respective parts of the border.  
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adds  either  professional  border  management  expertise 
or deep knowledge of the region’s political and economic 
dynamics.  Meanwhile,  BOMCA’s  regional  management 
office in Bishkek oversees and coordinates their activities 
and maintains their activities and maintain the programme’s 
region-wide focus. 
Box 1. BOMCA’s 12 projects
A core component of BOMCA’s action plan is the promotion 
of Integrated Border Management (IBM) in approximately 
twenty border crossing points across the region. Most of 
these points are located in the densely populated Fergana 
Valley, trisected by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan 
and in the remote Batken Oblast in Kyrgyzstan along the 
Tajik border. Ferghana hosts lucrative border markets and 
sees large-scale undocumented crossings that have bred 
serious  tensions  between  Uzbek  authorities,  who  seal 
the border to protect the autarchic economy and Kyrgyz 
authorities, who prefer an open trade border. Batken had 
seen violent resource conflicts across frontier communities 
seeking  cross-border  access  to  pastures,  firewood,  and 
water. It had also served as a conduit for militants from 
Tajikistan to enter Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
At  these  pilot  crossing  points,  BOMCA  encouraged  the 
Central Asian  states  to  adopt  IBM  methods  as  used  by 
the  European  Union.  IBM consists  of three  pillars:  intra-
agency  cooperation;  inter-agency  cooperation  across  a 
state’s  customs,  border  police,  immigration,  and  military; 
cross-border cooperation with counterpart agencies. IBMs 
can  have  a  series  of  benefits  for  border  management. 
They lower  the costs of border  control  when  contiguous 
states pool policing resources. They prevent unnecessary 
escalation by giving border authorities a point of contact 
with their counterparts so incidents can be resolved locally. 
They  may  also  prevent  corruption  by  enabling  agencies 
working in shared quarters to monitor one another. 
BOMCA intended the IBMs to function as a transformative 
experience  for  the  Central  Asian  governments.  As  one 
former BOMCA official explains:
“The point is that BOMCA is trying to get the 
five  governments  to  see  border  management 
and border posts not as cost centres gobbling 
up scarce government budgets, but as revenue 
generators  bringing  in  much  needed  customs 
revenues. Getting the various border agencies to 
work together can only strengthen this important 
difference in approach.”
Central Asian  officials  resisted  this  idea,  partly  because 
of growing  tensions  in  their  diplomatic  relations  but also 
because their border authorities were often drawn from the 
military and were thus resistant to cooperation with guards 
of neighbouring states. 
In Central Asia, border management necessarily intersects 
with counternarcotics. Drug trafficking networks ferry Afghan 
opiates across the region to markets in Russian and Europe, 
a trade whose export value across the region approximates 
several  billion  euro.  Counternarcotics  assistance  is  the 
purview  of  Central  Asia  Drug  Assistance  Programme 
(CADAP). CADAP is run by the same five in-country teams 
who run BOMCA and officials of the two programmes sit in 
the same offices and often work on both programme action 
plans. CADAP has provided airports and border crossings 
with drug detection equipment, legal assistance and training 
to Central Asian drug enforcement agencies, and training 
of drug-scenting dogs. The de jure separation of the two 
programmes keeps BOMCA’s public profile insulated from 
the issue of cross-border drug interdiction, a task that is 
fraught with pitfalls given the difficulty of interdiction and 
massive corruption generated by the drug trade across the 
region.4 
In the coming years, BOMCA will expand its focus to promote 
trade along two corridors: the Fergana Valley corridor, from 
Osh in Kyrgyzstan to Tashkent in Uzbekistan, and the North-
South  corridor  that  will  connect  Ashgabat  with  western 
Uzbekistan,  Kazakhstan,  and  the  Russian  Federation’s 
Caspian coast. The trade corridors complement the IBM 
pilot crossings and the Asian Development Bank’s CAREC 
programme, a massive $21 billion project that will sponsor 
the  construction  of  major  transport  and  trade  corridors 
across Central Asia and onwards to markets in proximate 
regions.5 
BOMCA recently suffered from a succession crisis concerning 
its programme manager position. This was triggered when a 
programme manager of American citizenship was appointed 
to  head  the  programme  in  2008.  The  citizenship  of  this 
4    For  example,  the  initial  provision  of  drug-sniffing  dogs  to  Tajik 
authorities  proved  ill-advised.  The  dogs  were  used  for  breeding 
purposes rather than drug detection. This generated debate across 
donors and country teams on how to boost accountability.
5   For more information on CAREC (Central Asia Regional Economic 
Cooperation), see www.adb.org/CAREC.
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legal reforms affecting border management •	
training	for	officers	in	border	service	management •	
regional cooperation in border management •	
intelligence sharing across member states •	
dissemination of information on border  •	
management
construction of training centres •	
establishment of joint border posts to promote  •	
synergy
creation of mobile border control units for remote  •	
frontier areas
creation of dog units for drug interdiction •	
professional	development	of	airport	authorities •	
facilitation of ties between local communities and  •	
border guards
mine	prevention	in	frontier	areas •	otherwise competent manager became an issue within the 
Commission in Brussels and for several EU ambassadors 
in Tajikistan who insisted that the top position be held by 
a  European. The  departure  of  the American  programme 
manager left BOMCA in an extended leadership vacuum and 
wasted time and effort for the UNDP and for the in-country 
teams that could have been better spent on implementing 
the project. The ‘American issue’ was put to rest in autumn 
2009 with the appointment of a new programme manager of 
Austrian citizenship and Russian background. 
Taking stock: BOMCA’s achievements
BOMCA can boast of a number of achievements in Central 
Asia: it has provided equipment estimated in millions of euro 
to Central Asian states. Such equipment includes binoculars, 
infrared goggles, and thermal cameras that some states 
may not have been able to procure in the absence of the 
programme. BOMCA has also provisioned border crossings 
with more mundane equipment such as refrigerators, which 
vitally enable border guards to store food and remain at 
remote posts for extended periods. 
BOMCA  has  sponsored  a  number  of  large  infrastructure 
projects across the region. These include crossing terminals 
along  the  Kyrgyz-Kazakh  border  and  the  construction  of 
border guard housing and customs facilities in remote areas 
of the Tajik border with Afghanistan. Along the Tajik-Afghan 
border, the programme coordinated its sponsoring of new 
border crossings with the location of bridges built across 
the border by the Aga Khan Foundation. This has enabled 
border markets to reopen and trade is making a comeback 
in the impoverished border region.6 
The programme has facilitated awareness of how national 
laws can complicate border management. Scores of laws in 
various Central Asian republics forbid or proscribe agencies 
from  cooperating  with  their  cross-border  counterparts.  In 
some  instances,  the  laws  also  hobble  bureaucrats  and 
police  from  cooperating  domestically  across  essential 
agencies. BOMCA has lobbied host governments to revise 
offending legislation. 
An  undervalued  if  notable  success  is  BOMCA’s  adept 
engagement  with  inward-looking  states.  Uzbekistan  and 
Turkmenistan  participate  less  to  procure  equipment  and 
more to benefit their international reputations. While these 
states tend to keep other international programmes at arm’s 
length – especially those that sponsor democracy and civil 
society  projects  –  they  have  been  warmer  to  BOMCA’s 
rule-of-law, capacity-building, and anti-trafficking agendas. 
These ties can yield unexpected benefits. Turkmenistan’s 
former  President  Niyazov  reportedly  streamlined  the 
6   In addition to BOMCA, the Border Management Programme for 
Badakhshan Afghanistan (BOMBAF) is funded by the UK and EU and 
implemented by UNDP. The programme has funded construction of 
border posts on the Afghan-Tajik border and equips and trains post 
staff.
excessive  number  of  checkpoints  in  border  zones  after 
BOMCA officials convinced him that the proliferating checks 
were redundant, expensive, and counterproductive. 
BOMCA has not uniformly fulfilled its entire action plan. It 
has trained scores of border officials across Central Asia, yet 
corruption remains rampant. BOMCA’s capacity and budget 
for training are limited and provide classes and workshops 
for a small portion of eligible border officers. The new OSCE 
Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, launched 
in May 2009, may go a long way in taking up the slack in 
training. However, the future relationship between BOMCA 
and OSCE may not necessarily be one of tight coordination. 
The college represents a substantial expansion of OSCE 
activities in the field of border management and this has 
proven a source of tension with EU-UNDP programmes.
BOMCA  has  limited  success  in  getting  Central  Asian 
authorities to consistently implement practices associated 
with IBM. Central Asian officials have been reluctant to share 
intelligence and lists of most-wanted suspects. BOMCA’s 
efforts to promote joint management have had the most 
success on the Kazakh-Kyrgyz Ak Jol border crossing near 
Bishkek. At the Ak Jol crossing, a BOMCA initiative enabled 
Kazakh  and  Kyrgyz  authorities  to  perform  passport  and 
vehicle checks jointly and simultaneously on one side and 
greatly expedited traffic. Currently, the two sides have fallen 
back on separate controls, but it is anticipated that they will 
return to IBM methods once Kazakhstan introduces a series 
of  measures  in  anticipation  of  joining  a  Customs  Union 
with Russia. The Ak Jol milestone, however, remains the 
exception rather than the rule along Central Asian border 
crossings.
Recommendations for the EU and BOMCA
The  BOMCA  programme  is  an  outstanding  model  of 
border  control  assistance.  It  is  more  coordinated  and 
comprehensive than other border management assistance 
initiatives in the broader region. US assistance to the region, 
for example, tends to be more piecemeal and focused on 
paramilitary training. Additionally, BOMCA is cheap relative 
to its geographic span and thematic scope, covering the 
Central Asian region for over half a decade for less than 
€50 million. But the EU can do more to increase its visibility 
in Central Asia and enhance BOMCA’s work. Here’s how:
Troubleshoot  structural  impediments  that  - 
affect  the  operations  of  BOMCA  country  teams. 
BOMCA’s success is less due to the unique EU-UNDP 
collaboration  and  more  to  the  credit  of  its  country 
teams who implement their action plans in politically 
and  geographically  difficult  environments.  Projects 
are often implemented at remote border crossings far 
from country team offices with less than comfortable 
accommodations.7  The  work  of  the  country  teams 
7   In Tajikistan, for example, it can take several days of travel to reach 
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reimbursement and travel authorisation, procurement 
of technical supplies, and in locating contractors who 
are  able  to  do  work  in  remote  border  posts.  All  of 
these require the Commission and UNDP to act more 
efficiently in meeting the needs of country teams and in 
coordinating their relationships with one another. 
Box 2. Assistance to neighbouring Afghanistan
Enhance  coordination  with  other  border  - 
management assistance sponsors in Central Asia. 
More states and organisations are sponsoring border 
management  assistance  abroad  and  this  includes 
the  Central  Asian  region  where  the  IOM,  Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation, and OSCE are increasingly 
some remote, high-elevation border crossings from Dushanbe. Once 
there, BOMCA teams may have little accommodation available. One 
former official reports having stayed with families in remote villages 
and sleeping on mattresses on cold, damp floors. 
active  in  border  assistance.  The  OSCE  Border 
Management Staff College in Dushanbe promises to 
become a major actor in training senior border police 
and customs officers and it is crucial for all sponsors 
to dispense assistance efficiently with a minimum of 
amount of mission creep and tension. 
Encourage  advances  in  border  management  - 
with  tailored  rewards.  Central  Asian  states  that 
implement  BOMCA’s  recommendations  and  reach 
critical benchmarks should be rewarded with more EU 
development aid and infrastructural investments in their 
border regions. Such incentives may encourage states 
to fight corruption in police and customs more actively 
and to adopt more open dispositions to trade. 
Create synergy with border management assistance  - 
programmes  in  Afghanistan.  Various  members  of 
the  international  community  are  currently  reforming, 
expanding, and training Afghan border police and border 
authorities  (see  Box  2).  The  EU  should  expand  the 
funding of BOMCA and give it the capacity to liaise with 
border  management  initiatives  in Afghanistan.  There 
is negligible cooperation between the government of 
Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics in matters 
of border control despite massive narcotics and arms 
trafficking  along  their  shared  borders.  The  BOMCA 
programme  could  function  as  a  useful  vehicle  to 
increase cross-border cooperation. 
Create an EU Fund for Border Management Reform  - 
to complement BOMCA’s work. The EU can constitute 
a fund to which member states and close partners such 
as Norway and Switzerland might also contribute. The 
fund could be used for border management projects 
across a wider geographic scope including Central Asia 
and also the Caucasus, the Russian Federation, and 
Afghanistan. A five-year fund totalling €100 million could 
cover a range of small-to-large border control projects 
across the above regions, and applications to the fund 
could be vetted by a committee convened jointly by 
BOMCA and the OSCE. The fund would heighten the 
visibility of the EU in border management assistance, 
make  up  for  lagging  EU  efforts  in Afghanistan,  and 
further  engage  Russia  and  other  states  in  win-win 
projects that benefit common security concerns.8
8    On  EU-Russian  relations  and  the  need  for  better  engagement 
strategies, see Michael Emerson, Synergies	vs.	Spheres	of	Influence	
in the Pan-European Space (Brussels: CEPS, 2009).
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After years of inaction, the international community 
has begun to focus on Afghanistan’s woeful border 
controls.	 The	 list	 of	 aid	 sponsors	 includes	 the	
United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 
(UNAMA),	 NATO’s	 International	 Security	
Assistance  Force  (ISAF),  the  European  Union 
Police	Mission	in	Afghanistan	(EUPOL),	the	US	
Departments	of	Homeland	Security,	Treasury,	and	
State,  and  the  US  military’s  Combined  Security 
Transition	Command	(CSTC-A).
The	programmes	target	a	variety	of	Afghan	border	
management needs: assessment and collection of 
customs	duties;	registration	of	traffic	at	international	
crossings; crisis response; drug interdiction; and 
combat	training	for	guards	at	remote	crossings.	
US	initiatives	account	for	the	lion’s	share	of	this	
assistance.	These	include	CSTC-A	a	generously	
funded  US  military  programme  that  trains  and 
equips Afghan Border Police slated for duty along 
remote border crossings and the DHS-led Border 
Management	 Task	 Force	 that	 oversees	 pilot	
programmes	for	official	crossings.	
While	 EUPOL	 liaises	 regularly	 with	 CSTC-A,	
the  European  Union’s  imprint  on  Afghan  border 
management  is  admittedly  minor  and  can  be 
expanded only if Brussels increases funding for 
such projects and negotiates a broader role with 
the	US,	ISAF,	UN	and	government	of	Afghanistan.	
This	expansion	would	be	worthwhile	as	existing	
aid is concentrated along the eastern border with 
Pakistan,	 leaving	 deficits	 along	 Afghanistan’s	
northern	 and	 western	 borders	 (respectively	 with	
Central	Asia	and	Iran).	www.eucentralasia.eu
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- to enhance accountability through the provision of high quality information 
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  - A  final  monitoring  report  of  the  EUCAM  Expert  Working  Group  will  be 
produced by the project rapporteurs. 
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Central Asian states and the members countries of the EU. In addition to 
expert  meetings,  several  public  seminars  will  be  organised  for  a  broad 
audience including EU representatives, national officials and legislators, the 
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EUCAM  is  sponsored  by  the  Open  Society  Institute  (OSI)  and  the 
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